The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets:Evidence from Late Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs by Andersen, Asger Lau et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets
Andersen, Asger Lau; Lassen, David Dreyer; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Andersen, A. L., Lassen, D. D., & Nielsen, L. H. W. (2010). The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets:
Evidence from Late Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs. Department of Economics, University of
Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
EPRU Working Paper Series        2010-11 
 
 
 
Economic Policy Research Unit 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26 
DK-1353 Copenhagen K 
DENMARK 
Tel: (+45) 3532 4411 
Fax: (+45) 3532 4444 
Web: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets: Evidence 
from Late Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs 
 
 
 
 
Asger Lau Andersen, David Dreyer Lassen, 
and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0908-7745 
 
The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets: Evidence from Late
Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs
Asger Lau Andersen, David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
First version: October 2010
Abstract
Does scal governance a¤ect government borrowing costs? We operationalize scal gov-
ernance as the ability of governments to pass a budget on time and, using a unique data
set on budget enactment dates, analyze the e¤ect of such late budgets on government bond
yield spreads. Based on a sample of 36 US states in the period 1988-1997, we estimate that
a budget delay of 30 days has a long run impact on the yield spread between 2 and 10 basis
points. States with su¢ cient liquidity in the form of large reserves face small or no costs
from late budgets.
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1. Introduction
How does scal governance, the way a government goes about its scal business, a¤ect
its borrowing costs? Recent events in a number of EMU member countries have revealed
large di¤erence in governance practices despite a reasonably common set of scal institutions,
rules and regulations within the EMU, and the crises in state-level government nances in the
US similarly suggests widely di¤erent governance practices emerging from seemingly similar
institutional set-ups.
This paper investigates how scal governance a¤ect nancial market evaluations of gov-
ernments scal health. A large literature has investigated both economic and political
determinants of di¤erences in government bond yields, including both scal institutions and
key government budget variables, both across countries and across subnational governments,
but there exists no study that goes beyond looking at formal institions and instead at actual
governance practices. We focus on one key element of scal governance, the (in)ability of
political actors involved in the budget process to pass a timely budget. This was stressed by
Putnam (1993) as a key variable on governance, and expert survey assessments of whether
budgets are concluded in a timely fashion appear as a part of commonly used measures of
governance, including the Pew Centers initiative on state government performance employed
by Knack (2002). We investigate the extent to which such bad scal governance a¤ects the
costs of servicing government debt.
Our empirical analysis is carried out in the context of US state governments, and is based
on a unique data set, collected by us, containing the dates of nal passage of the budget,
identied using legislative records, newspaper sources and a survey of state budget o¢ cers.
These data show that negotiations over the state budget often drag on well beyond the be-
ginning of the new scal year, which is generally recognized to be the nal deadline for timely
passage of a budget. In the sample we consider below, consisting of 36 state governments in
the period 1988-1997, 29.7 % of state budgets were enacted after the beginning of the new
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scal year, with the average delay equal to 25 days.
Late budgets are, moreover, not only a historical phenomenon. Recent experiences with
late budgets in California and New York have, once again, emphasized the problem of budget
gridlock in US states; for example, in 2009, California went 24 days into the new scal
year with no reserves before a new state budget was agreed on, while in 2010 the budget
negotiations have dragged on for a record setting three months so far. Also in 2010, citizens in
New York had to wait 125 days beyond the scal year deadline before a new state budget was
signed into law, with state o¢ cials beginning to prepare for the states rst-ever government
shutdown, as political deadlock threatened to end the series of emergency budget bills the
state relied on to stay in operation.
When a government does not have a budget in place by the beginning of the new scal
year, the legal basis for government spending is jeopardized. This can, among other things,
lead to disruptions in debt payments and can serve to highlight concerns about the sustain-
ability of government nances also in the longer run, including an increased preceived risk of
government default. During the scal crisis of state governments in the early 1990s, analyzed
in Poterba (1994), Moodys Investor Services noted that [budget] delays are symptomatic
of serious nancial imbalancescontinuing that while [b]udget delays do not automatically
lead to a long-term rating revision [...] the resulting pressures on a states short-term liquid-
ity position can trigger a review.1 Similar concerns are often voiced in public debates on
late budgets.
Late budgets can a¤ect state borrowing costs through two channels, a liquidity premium
on state bonds and by serving as a market signal. Regarding the former, states may not
have the legal authority to make appropriations towards debt repayments without a budget
in place. While some states have special provisions in place to avoid exactly this, and in
general make debt payments one of their rst priorities, a state government can simply nd
it self out of cash to spend on any provisions, including debt repayments,.if the budget
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negotiations drag on for too long. The risk of this occurring increases with each day that
passes by without a new budget in place. As investors observe such late budgets, they will
require a higher premium for holding state debt.
The possibility of a late budget to be a market signal arises from the fact that bond
market participants may not always have perfect information about the true scal position
of the state government. Severe budgets delays are likely to arise when painful adjustments
are needed to secure state solvency. Thus, the inability to pass the budget can provide a
strong signal to the market about the presence of large unresolved scal imbalances, and,
perhaps most importantly, that the political actors responsible for the budget lack the ability
to deal with these problems in an appropriate and timely manner. As such, it is not the
immediate consequences of the late budget itself that lead to higher borrowing costs; rather,
it is the fact that it draws the markets attention to the states scal problems, possibly
triggering changes in the states credit rating, that creates a causal link from a late budget
to state borrowing costs.
We measure state borrowing costs by state general-obligation bond yields from the Chubb
Insurance Company Relative Value Survey, explained in detail below. Our data on late
budgets begin in 1988 and the data series on the Chubb Relative Survey, available for 36 state
governments, ends in 1997. We estimate the relationship between the number of days without
a budget and state borrowing costs using a dynamic panel GMM-model, which explicitly
recognizes the strong degree of persistence in our dependent variable and controls for xed
state characteristics. We nd that budget delays signicantly increase state government
bond yields in a substantive way. These ndings are robust to controlling for a host of other
variables identied in the literature, including scal institutions, economic conditions and
scal outcomes.
A number of previous papers have used the Chubb survey, as it is the only data set that
provides comparable bond yields across state governments. Eichengreen (1992) considers the
3
e¤ect of balanced budget requirements on bond yields and Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom
(1995) examine in detail the e¤ects of the size of government debt. Poterba and Rueben
(1999, 2001) examine the e¤ects of a broad range of scal institutions, and Lowry and Alt
(2001) examine both the interaction between scal institutions and the economy as well as
the role of political parties. A number of these topics have also been addressed in the cross-
country literature on yield spreads and borrowing costs, including Codogno et al. (2003) on
the EMU and Hallerberg and Wol¤ (2008), who look specically at scal institutions within
EMU member countries.
The paper proceeds in the following way: The next section describes our data and em-
pirical strategy, while section 3 presents our empirical results and quantitative assesments.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
2.1. The Chubb Relative Value Survey
Comparable market data on state bond yields are not readily available. Following Poterba
and Rueben (2001) and Lowry and Alt (2001) we instead use data on state government
bond yield spreads given from the Chubb Relative Value Survey.This survey measures
the bond yield for 39 states relative to New Jersey by asking roughly 25 sell-side bond
traders to estimate the current yield, measured in basis points, on a hypothetical 20-year
general obligation bond, relative to comparable bonds issued by the state of New Jersey.2
Thus, di¤erences in yields should only reect di¤erences in perceived riskiness of the states
general obligation debt, and not di¤erences in maturity or other bond charachteristics.3 The
survey was conducted about every 6 months from July 1973 to January 1998. From 1976
to 1992, the survey was conducted in June and December.4 In 1993 it was conducted in
June, and beginning in 1994, the survey was done in January and July. Our dependent
variable, Chubbi;t, is constructed as the average of the summer (June/July) and winter
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(December/January) Chubb surveys, such that Chubb i;t reects survey answers given after
the budget negotiations in the spring of year t, but before next years budget negotiations
commence. Thus, up to and including 1992, our dependent variable is given as the average
of the June and December survey. Our 1993 observation is the average of the surveys from
June 1993 and January 1994, and our 1994 observation is the average of the surveys from
July 1994 and January 1995. The 1995 to 1997 observations are constructed in a similar
manner as the 1994 observation.
2.2. Late budgets
What constitutes a late budget? In practice, budget processes vary considerably across
US states. This complicates cross-state comparisons of budget timeliness, for investors and
scholars alike, as there is no obvious, universal denition of when a budget is late. In this
paper, we dene budget negotiations to be concluded when the budget is nally enacted,
typically by the governor signing the budget. 5 We compare this date to the date when the
scal year begins and count the di¤erence in days; we call this measure days_latei;t: Thus, if
the budget for the scal year that starts in year t is signed into law 5 days after the end of the
old scal year in state i, days_latei;t takes the value 5. If the budget is signed into law 5 days
before the end of the old scal year, it takes the value  5. The marginal e¤ect on government
yield spreads of using another day to nish the budget is likely to change dramatically once
the scal year deadline is exceeded. To account for this, we separate days_latei;t into two
variables: days_late_negi;t; which is equal to days_latei;t if days_latei;t is negative, and
zero otherwise, and the corresponding variable for positive values, days_late_posi;t.
The data for the budget enactment dates were collected from three sources: (i) State leg-
islatureswebsites; (ii) Archived newspaper articles; and (iii) a survey sent to state budget
o¢ cers. Some state legislatureswebsites have detailed information on the status and histo-
ries of all bills enacted in previous legislative sessions, including the budget bill(s). However,
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most state legislaturesbill tracking tools only cover the most recent legislative sessions, if
any. We therefore supplemented with information from archived (mostly state and local)
newspaper articles accessed via Newslibrary.com.6 Finally, we also sent a survey to state
budget o¢ cers asking them to conrm the data we had collected ourselves as well as provide
us with the information that we had not been able to nd via any of the other sources. Out
of the 48 mainland states, 19 responded to our survey. When overlapping, the data they
reported were virtually identical to the data we collected ourselves.7
Figure 1 shows the distribution of budget enactment dates relative to the beginning of
the scal year. A large share of budgets are enacted very close to the deadline, but many
budgets are nalized after the deadline. For the years 1988-1997 we have recorded 79 cases
where the budget was signed into law after the beginning of the new scal year, on average
by 25.3 days. This amounts to 29.7 % of the budgets for which we have data.
[Figure 1 about here]
The distribution of late budgets is not even across states, as can be seen from Figure 2
showing the share of budgets that were late for the 36 states in our sample for the period we
consider. The most important causes of late budgets are the presence of divided government
and the state economic situation, measured by changes in the state unemployment rate;
these causes are analyzed in detail in Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a), and included
as controls in our analysis below.
[Figure 2 about here]
2.3. Econometric model and explanatory variables
Following Poterba and Rueben (2001), we can estimate state i0s spread to New Jersey
(denoted with subscript NJ) in a given year t, Ri;t  RNJ;t; as:
Ri;t  RNJ;t = F (Xi;t; Zi;t; Y i;t)  F (XNJ;t; ZNJ;t; Y NJ;t)
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where Xi;t is a vector of economic and scal variables that are likely to a¤ect the states
probability of paying current and future interest obligations. We include our measure of
late budgets in this category since, as argued above, late budgets are likely to increase the
riskiness of interest payments. Zi;t is a vector of state scal institutions that are likely to
a¤ect government spending and its ability to collect revenues. No carry-over rules and tax
and expenditure limits are examples of this. Y i;t proxies scal taste for debt repayment and
other relevant political variables. Linearizing the above equation, the bond spread in state
i in year t can be expressed as:
Ri;t RNJ;t =  01 (Xi;t  XNJ;t)+
0
2 (Zi;t   ZNJ;t)+
0
3 (Yi;t   YNJ;t)+i+t+ui;t uNJ;t (1)
where j is kj1 vector of coe¢ cients andXi;t; Zi;t and Yi;t are our observed values ofXi;t; Zi;t
and Y i;t, respectively. i is an unobserved state xed e¤ect and t measures aggregate shocks.
ui;t captures omitted variables and errors from approximation. Since bond yields display a
great deal of persistence, as noted by Lowry and Alt (2001), we also include lags of the
dependent variable, making the model a dynamic panel data model.8 Including L lags and
dening Ri;t  RNJ;t  Chubbi;t; equation (1) can be written as the following:
Chubbi;t = 1Chubbi;t 1 + :::+ LChubbi;t L + 
0
1Xi;t + 
0
2Zi;t + 
0
3Yi;t + i + t + "i;t (2)
where we use that t  t   
0
1XNJ;t   
0
2ZNJ;t   
0
3YNJ;t   uNJ;t is constant across i in year
t. We choose a value of L such that the error term, "i;t; displays iid properties. We estimate
this dynamic panel data model using the GMM procedure developed in Arellano and Bond
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Bond and Blundell (1998). However, as robustness
checks we also estimate the model using the OLS and Fixed E¤ect estimators.
We now turn to the exact content ofXi;t; Zi;t and Yi;t, the vectors of explanatory variables.
For the sake of brevity, we limit ourselves to a short description of the variables here. Precise
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denitions of all variables and their data sources can be found in the data appendix.
2.3.1. Economic and scal variables
An obvious control variable is the level of state government debt. We scale the debt level
relative to state GDP, because we want to measure the debt burden relative to the tax base.
The state government budget surplus in the old scal year, i.e. the scal year that ends
in year t, is another natural control. As in Lowry and Alt (2001), we therefore include a
variable that is equal to zero in case of a decit and otherwise equal to the (actual) surplus
in percent of state GDP. We also include the corresponding variable for the decit, thus
allowing the e¤ect of government net lending to di¤er depending on whether it is negative or
positive. Like Lowry and Alt, we always include an interaction between our decit variable
and a dummy for whether the state has a no carry-over rule in place.
To control for the e¤ect of business cycle uctuations we include the change in the state
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable.9 Following Poterba and Rueben (2001), we
also use the decit shock variables originally developed in Poterba (1994) to control for scal
shocks. Unlike Poterba and Rueben, however, we allow the e¤ects of revenue shocks and
expenditure shocks to di¤er by including a separate variable for each type of shock.
Government bond yields are likely to be sensitive to the liquidity position of the state
government, and easy access to readily available funds is important for reliable debt service.
We therefore include the (projected) end-of-year balance in the states general fund and
stabilization fund as an explanatory variable in our baseline specication.10
Finally, we include the change in the states credit rating since the previous year as an
explanatory variable.11 We do this for two reasons: First, this may capture new information
about the states future ability to repay its debt obligations, which is known to rating agencies
and investors, but unobservable to us (the researchers). Second, the credit rating itself can
have an independent e¤ect in an uninformed market if it inuences investor sentiments, even
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if the rating is not based on any fundamentals.
2.3.2. Political variables
Divided partisan control over the state government may potentially work as a check on
new spending initiatives, thereby leading to lower borrowing costs. This is likely to be
especially important in the absence of strict balanced budget rules. To account for this, we
include a dummy for divided government, as well as its interaction with a dummy for no
carry-over rules. Investor sentiments can also be inuenced by the political preferences of
the politicians in charge of scal policy. As a nal control variable, we therefore include
a measure of government ideology, taken from Berry et al (1998), where a higher value is
associated with more liberal preferences.
2.4. Conditional e¤ects of late budgets
The liquidity premium and market signal channels described above imply that the impact
of late budgets on government bond yields depends on a number of observable characteristics.
First, if a state ended the old scal year with a budget decit and only few cash funds
available in the general fund and stabilization fund, then we would expect a larger e¤ect of
late budgets through the liquidity premium channel, since such funds provide a safeguard
against the risk that the state will run out of cash during a protracted political stalemate
over a new budget. Second, a budget delay is likely to send a much more powerful signal
about politicians inability to deal with underlying scal imbalances when it is combined
with a large decit and a low end-balance in the scal year that just ended: If politicians
cant agree on an answer to a states scal problems when they are most pressing, and when
the costs of inaction are likely to be highest, it seems unlikely that they ever will.12
A similar argument applies to the e¤ect of election years: Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen
(2010b) nd that voters punish state legislators, and, to a lesser extent, governors, for late
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budgets at the election polls. It seems plausible that this potential consequence of budget
delays will assume a more prominent place in the minds of state lawmakers in election
years than in o¤-election years. If state politicians are unable to pass a budget on time in
an election year, despite the saliency of the potential consequences in such years, it may
therefore send a stronger signal to nancial markets about the state governments inability
to deal with the scal challenges facing the state.
We test these hypotheses by estimating alternative versions of (2) that include interaction
terms between our late budget variable days_late_posi;t and each of the following: The
size of the combined balance in the general fund and the budget stabilization fund at the
end of the old scal year, the government surplus in the old scal year, and a dummy for
state general election year. We then expect negatively signed coe¢ cients on the rst two
interaction terms, and a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term involving the election
year dummy.
3. Results
Table 1 shows the results from our baseline specication. Columns (1)-(3) reports es-
timates of equation (2) using the OLS, Fixed E¤ects and GMM estimators, respectively.
We include four lags of our dependent variable to account for autocorrelation in the yield
spread.13 The estimated coe¢ cients on the control variables are largely as expected. Larger
debt, lower end-of-year balances and deteriorating credit ratings all increase the yield spread,
with the e¤ects being signicant on a 1% level. Unexpected expenditure shocks also have a
signicant impact on the yield spread, but we do not nd any signicant e¤ect from shocks
to state revenue. Nor do we nd any signicant e¤ects from yearly changes in the state
unemployment rate.
The impact of the state governments scal balance in the old scal year depends strongly
on whether this balance is positive or negative: Higher surpluses do not seem to a¤ect yield
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spreads. Decits, on the other hand, have a strong impact. This is only true for states
that allow decits to be carried over to the next scal year, however: States that have a
no-carry-over law in place see no e¤ect on the yield spread from decits, as can be seen
by the negative coe¢ cient on gov_deficit_no_carryi;t; which is signicant and similar in
magnitude to the coe¢ cient on gov_deficiti;t.
More liberal government seem to pay a higher yield spread, but the e¤ect is only border-
line signicant. Finally, having divided government tends to lower the yield spread in states
that do not have a no-carry over law in place, whereas states with strict no-carry over laws
see no e¤ect of divided government.
We now turn to our main variables of interest, days_late_negi;t and days_late_posi;t.
The coe¢ cients on both variables are positive, implying that longer negotiations over the
budget are associated with higher yield spreads. The coe¢ cient on days_late_posi;t is highly
statistically signicant, and much larger than the coe¢ cient on days_late_negi;t, which is
very close to zero. We interpret these results as evidence in favor of our priors: Taking an
extra day to nish the budget does not a¤ect investorsrequirements for state government
bond yields much as long as the scal year deadline is not exceeded. Once the deadline
has been passed, however, further delays in the budget process lead to signicantly higher
borrowing costs.
These results are robust in terms of sign and levels of signicance to removing out-
liers, but if we remove the three observations where negotiations dragged on for more than
100 days, which is Wisconsin in 1997 and New York in 1996 and 1997, the coe¢ cient on
days_late_posi;t more than quadruples, from .026 to .115, and is robust to further trunca-
tions of the sample; we return to this when we discuss the quantitative impacts below.
[Table 1 about here]
Next, we move on to include interaction terms between our late budget variable and
the variables discussed in the previous section. Table 2 shows the results.14 We start by
11
interacting days_late_posi;t with the size of the end-of-year balance in the old scal year.
The coe¢ cient on days_late_posi;t is positive, signicant at a 1% level and almost twice as
large as the estimate from column (3) in Table 1. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term
with the end-of-year balance is negative and also highly signicant. Thus, larger end-of-year
balances in the general fund and budget stabilization fund mute the impact of late budgets
on state government borrowing costs. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the sizes
of the estimated coe¢ cients suggests that late budgets only cause yield spreads to rise in
states where fund reserves amount to less than 2% of general fund expenditures. This applies
to approximately a third of the observations in our sample.
In column (2) we interact days_late_posi;t with the old scal years government surplus
(relative to state GDP).15 The coe¢ cient on days_late_posi;t is positive, large and signi-
cant, while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term with the government surplus is negative
and highly signicant. Thus, late budgets have a smaller e¤ect on government yield spreads
if they are accompanied by a su¢ ciently large surplus, but severe if accompanied by a decit:
At a decit of 1% of general state government spending, the impact of a budget delays is
almost three times larger than when the last scal year ended in balance (gov_spli;t = 0).
In column (3), we include both interactions terms simultaneously. The coe¢ cients on the
interactions terms decrease slightly compared to columns (1) and (2), but they are both still
negative and highly signicant.
In column (4), we interact days_late_posi;t with a dummy for gubernatorial election
year. We nd that the marginal impact of late budgets in non-election years is around the
same as what we found in our baseline specication in Table 1. In contrast, the e¤ect is
about four times larger in election years.16
To sum up, the results found here broadly conrm our hypotheses about the conditional
e¤ects of late budgets on government bond yield spreads: The availability of previously
accumulated reserves dampen the impact of late budgets on state government borrowing
12
costs, while scal imbalances and the proximity of upcoming elections magnify it.
[Table 2 about here]
3.1. Quantifying the E¤ect of Late Budgets
How large are the e¤ects of late budgets on state government borrowing costs? In the
following, we use our estimates from the previous section to calculate the impact on yield
spreads of a hypothetical 30-day budget delay. While delays of this length are in most states
not everyday news, they do occur: Of the 266 budget adoption processes in our sample, 79
were delayed beyond the beginning of the new scal year, and 23 of those, almost 10 percent
of the sample, by 30 days or more.
Using our baseline estimates of the coe¢ cient on days_late_posi;t from Table 1, we see
that that the immediate impact of a 30-day delay is about 1 basis point. That is, for every
10,000 dollars of debt issued, the state must now pay an extra dollar in interest. Taking the
persistence in the yield spread into account, we can calculate a "long run" impact on total
interest payments. To do this, we consider a thought experiment in which a state issues new
debt (or renances existing debt) for a xed amount each year. In this situation, the total
e¤ect of a late budget, measured in basis points and summed over all future years, can be
calculated by multiplying the immediate impact with the long run impact factors reported
in the bottom of tables 1 and 2. Our baseline estimates in Table 1 thus suggest that the total
long run impact of a 30-day late budget is in the range of 2 basis points (when using the
lower bound estimates given by the GMM and Within estimators) and 5 basis points (using
the upper bound estimate given by the OLS estimator).17 As noted above, these results are,
however, signicantly inuenced by three outliers where budget negotiations dragged on for
more than 100 days past the deadline. In the robust sample without these outliers, e¤ects
are considerably larger: The immediate impact of a 30-day delay is 3.5 basis points based on
the GMM estimator, with a corresponding total long-run impact equal to 10.0 basis points.
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For both the full and the robust samples, the estimates reported in Table 1 and above
reect unconditional average e¤ects across all observations in our sample. As shown in Table
2, the impact of late budgets di¤ers substantially depending on the economic and political
circumstances under which they occur. In a state where scal reserves are approaching zero,
our results indicate an immediate impact of 1.4 basis points following a 30-day delay, and a
long run impact of 4.2 basis points. Similarly, conditioning on the size of the budget decit
in the old scal year reveals a substantial variation in the e¤ect of a 30-day delay: For a state
than ran a decit equal to 0.34% of state GDP (the average decit among all decits in our
sample), we nd immediate- and long run impacts of 3 and 9 basis points, respectively, while
the corresponding numbers are 1.8 and 5.6 basis points for a state with a balanced budget,
and 0.7 and 1.9 basis points for states with a surplus equal to 0.37% of state GDP (the
sample average of all surpluses). Furthermore, the results in column (4) of Table 2 suggest
that the impact of a 30-day late budget is more than 4 times larger in election years than
in non-election years (the long run impact rising from 2.3 to 9.4 basis points). Finally, the
coe¢ cient estimates in column (5), where we include all interaction terms simultaneously,
show that a 30-day delay has a long run impact of 14.2 basis points when we condition on an
end-of-year balance at zero, a decit at 0.34% of GDP, and a gubernatorial election coming
up.
Whether these numbers are smallor largeis not obvious. For comparison, the average
spread to New Jersey in our sample is 8.5 basis points with a standard deviation of 15 basis
points. One way to assess the magnitude of the impact of late budgets is to compare it to
the impact of other economic factors. Imagine a state (without a no-carry-over requirement)
ending its scal year with a budget decit equal to 0.34% of state GDP (the sample average)
and a timely adopted budget for the new scal year. In this situation, going from an on-time
budget to a 30-day delay has the same impact on the yield spread as a three-fold increase
of the decit, or as a 14% unexpected increase in general fund expenditures (as measured
14
by the decit shock variable exp_shocki;t).18 Thus, when it comes to the impact on state
government borrowing costs, lengthy delays in the budget adoption process are comparable
to sizeable, adverse scal shocks.
3.2. Robustness Analysis
In Table 3 we consider a number of robustness issues. Columns (1) to (3) replicate
Table 1, but with days_late_posi;t and days_late_negi;t, our variables of primary interest,
replaced with two new variables, days_delayed_posi;t and days_delayed_negi;t. Rather
than counting the number of days from the end of the scal year until the budget is signed
into law, these variables focus on legislative budget delays by measuring the number of days
from the legislatures deadline for passing the budget until the legislature actually passes the
budget in its nal form (see Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a) for details). Using these
alternative measures does little to change our conclusions, although the estimated e¤ects of
budget delays are now somewhat smaller.19
A key theme in Poterba and Rueben (1999, 2001) is how the e¤ect of scal shocks on
borrowing costs depends on state scal institutions. Our baseline estimation results reported
above do not allow for such interactions. We compensate for this in the estimations reported
in Table A1 in the appendix. Here we interact dummy variables for no carry-over rules as
well as tax- and expenditure limits (TELs) with each of the expenditure shock and revenue
shock variables. The results broadly conrm the conclusions found in Poterba and Rueben
(2001): Having a no carry-over rules in place seems to neutralize the impact of expenditure
shocks. The same is the case for expenditure limits. There does not seem to be much e¤ect
of expenditure limits on the impact of revenue shocks. Tax limits appear to have a clear
e¤ect on expenditure shocks but not on revenue shocks. Most importantly for our purposes,
however, the inclusion of these interaction terms does in no case change the sign, magnitude
or statistical signicance of the late budget variable days_late_posi;t.
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[Table 3 about here]
4. Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of bad scal governance in the form of late budgets on
state government borrowing costs in the US. We nd that late budgets signicantly increase
the yield spread on hypothetical 20-year general obligation bonds. Our results provide clear
evidence that bond market investors bad scal governance as a reason for concern when it
comes to the prospect of uninterrupted repayments on state debt, and they strongly suggest
a link between late budgets and higher state borrowing costs.
The average, unconditional long-run cost of a 30-day late budget is an increase in the
yield spread fo about 10 basis points based on the robust sample. The e¤ect varies greatly
depending on the states economic and political situation, however. Easy access to liquidity,
for example in the form of previously accumulated reserves, reduces investorsfear of payment
disruptions in case of a late budget, thereby lowering the premium paid for budgets delays. In
contrast, the impact of a month-long delay is much higher if the state has run out of reserves.
Markets also punish late budgets much more harshly if they occur during times of scal stress.
In such times, a late budget sends a powerful signal about politicians(lack of) ability to
address scal imbalances, and investors react more sharply. A related e¤ect is present in
election years: When an election is approaching, the personal costs to state politicians of
a late budget are presumably higher, and delays in the budget process demonstrate more
clearly that politicians are incapable of reaching scal compromises. Indeed, our results show
that the reaction of bond market participants to late budgets is 4 times stronger in election
years than in non-election years.
Our estimates should be seen as a lower bound on the economic costs of late budgets.
Costs related to the disruption of state government services and payments, di¢ culties in
scal planning in state agencies and local governments, and the uncertainty facing state gov-
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ernment employees and citizens are likely to be substantial, but are practically impossible to
measure.20 With the lower bound being positive, our results provide a strong rationale for
state governments to avoid lengthy delays in the budget process. And, perhaps equally as im-
portant, they provide voters with a rationale for holding their elected politicians accountable
when they fail to deliver a state budget on time.
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Notes
1Quoted from The Bond Buyer, July 2, 1992
(http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-12436969.html)
2States excluded from the Chubb survey are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, In-
diana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wyoming. Since our data set on late
budgets does not include Alaska and Hawaii, and since our sample for Montana starts after
the end of the Chubb survey, our e¤ective sample consists of a total of 36 states (not counting
New Jersey).
3See the discussion in Poterba and Rueben (1999, 2001).
4The exact time of the survey varied slightly before 1976.
5There are a number of exceptions to this general denition: for example, if the governor
vetoes the entire budget, the legislature can in most states override the veto by some super
majority vote in both chambers, and the budget then becomes law without the governors
signature; alternatively, governors may in some states let the budget become law without
signing it, simply by letting the deadline for gubernatorial vetoes run out.
Our measurement is further complicated by the fact that some states do not pass a
single, all-encompassing budget bill. Instead, their budgets consist of several individual
appropriation bills. In such cases we do not consider the budget fully enacted until the last
appropriation bill for state operations has been enacted. Also, state governments sometimes
react to unexpected developments in state government nances by passing within-scal year
supplementary appropriation bills. We do not view such supplementary budget bills as part
of the budget adoption process that we are interested in, however, and we therefore restrict
our attention to the budgets as originally enacted. See Andersen et al. (2010a) for a thorough
discussion of these and other related issues.
6Newslibrary.com is an online newspaper archive that covers more than 2,500 news sources
across the United States. We also used The New York Times online archive on several
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occasions to access relevant news articles. In many cases, these newspaper accounts contained
additional information helpful in handling uncertain cases. All articles used in constructing
the data set is on le with the authors.
7The instructions for the survey are available from the authors upon request. Table A.1
gives details on the coverage of and sources of information on late budgets for each state.
8Using the Dicky-Fuller test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels, as proposed by Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003), we can clearly reject the presence of a unit root in our spread
variable.
9We include the unemployment rate in rst di¤erences, but obtain very similar results
when using the level of the unemployment rate.
10The end-of-year balance is measured in percent of proposed general fund expenditures
(see data appendix for more details).
11We use the rst di¤erence of Moodys rating, where positive values imply an improved
rating.
12The lack of immediately available funds were a major factor leading to Californias deci-
sion to issue IOUs when faced with a late budget in 2009. In New York in 2010, government
workers where given furlough notices as a way of reducing expenditures during a severe
budget delay that prevented a more permanent decit-reducing solution from being imple-
mented. Thus late budgets seem more likely to lead to particularly disruptive outcomes
when they occur along with government decits and low government savings.
13We also tried including a fth lag, but this was never signicant. Our results are not
sensitive to the exact number of lags. Testing for autocorrelation in all our GMM estimations
revealed no signs of second order or higher autocorrelation, which suggests that the GMM
procedure is indeed valid. Note that our sample size is not reduced when introducing more
lags of the dependent variable, since we have data for the yield spread available well before
1988.
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14As in the analyses above, the coe¢ cient on days_late_negi;t is very small in all cases,
so for simplicity we impose a zero restriction on it in the analyses presented in this section.
Relaxing this restriction does not change the results for the interaction terms involving
days_late_posi;t.
15We do not separate surpluses from decits here. Decits thus appear as negative values.
16As shown in column (5) of Table 2, including all three interaction terms simultaneously
does not alter the estimated coe¢ cients much compared to when we include them separately,
and all coe¢ cients are signicant on a 1% level.
17Assume that the state needs to nance a xed amount X , where X is measured in ten
thousands of dollars. A 1-day late budget in year t then gives rise to extra interest costs
worth LX for debt issued in year t, 1LX for debt issued in year t+ 1, (
2
1 + 2)LX for
year t + 2, etc., where L is the coe¢ cient on days_late_posi;t and i is the coe¢ cient on
the i0th lag of the dependent variable. Applying the formula for an innite geometric series
then gives us a long run impact of (1   1   :::   L) 1L, where the rst term represents
the long run impact factors reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
18These calculations are based on the estimation results of the specication in Table 2,
column (2). The estimated coe¢ cients on gov_deficiti;t and exp_shocki;t (not reported
in Table 2) are 4.402 and 0.207, respectively. The implied e¤ects on yield spreads are
comparable in size to those found in Lowry and Alt (2001) and Poterba and Rueben (2001).
19In additional robustness analyses, we restricted our sample to states the experienced a
late budget at least once in the period for which we have data. This does not a¤ect results.
20As noted in a New York Times editorial in the run up to a possible shutdown in 2010:
"[A] shutdown would disrupt millions of lives, cost millions of dollars and leave state o¢ cials
scrambling to operate prisons, the State Police and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
[...]". (New York Times editorial on June 12, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/opinion/12sat1.html?hp)
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Figure 1: The date of budget completion relative to the beginning of the scal year, 36
states, 1988-97.
Note: The sample of states excludes AK and HI as well as states that are not rated in
the Chubb Relative Survey, as noted in the text. We do not have information for all
states for all years, see Table A3 for details.
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Figure 2: The share of budgets passed after the beginning of the new scal year, 36
states, 1988-97.
Note: The sample of states excludes AK and HI as well as states that are not rated in
the Chubb Relative Survey, as noted in the text. We do not have information for all
states for all years, see Table A3 for details.
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Table 1. The Effect of Late Budgets on Yields Spred on 20‐year GO Debt
(1) (2) (3)
Days_late_neg i,t 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.035*** 0.025** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Unempl_change i,t 0.252 0.051 ‐0.06
(0.404) (0.484) (0.413)
Endbalance i,t ‐0.168*** ‐0.192*** ‐0.315***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
D_Moodys i,t ‐5.798*** ‐6.435*** ‐6.766***
(1.509) (1.760) (1.639)
Debt i,t 0.110** 0.274 0.375***
(0.044) (0.274) (0.143)
Rev_shock i,t ‐0.038 ‐0.024 ‐0.041
(0.047) (0.053) (0.069)
Exp_shock i,t 0.196*** 0.176** 0.224***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.082)
Gov_surplus i,t 1.257** 0.528 0.603
(0.618) (0.746) (1.260)
Gov_deficit i,t 7.141*** 3.7 4.640**
(1.624) (2.492) (1.878)
Gov_deficit i,t   x No_carry i ‐8.007*** ‐5.066* ‐6.379***
(1.979) (2.607) (1.670)
Divided_gov i,t ‐0.45 ‐1.488 ‐1.721*
(0.797) (0.888) (0.919)
Divided_gov i,t  x No_carry i 0.239 0.844 1.255*
(0.487) (0.520) (0.653)
Ideology_gov i,t 0.006 0.027 0.051
(0.011) (0.018) (0.031)
No_carry i 0.073
(0.425)
Estimator OLS FE GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 4.957 2.686 2.925
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266
See Table A2 for variable description
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐year GO debt
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Cluster adjusted standard errors used in colums (1) and (2). Robust 
standard errors used in colum (3).
GMMSYS estimates are obtained using the dependent variable lagged twice or more as instruments in the 
differenced equation. The level equation uses the lagged first difference of the dependent variable as instrument.
Table 2.  Interacting Late Budget with Endbalances, Government Surplus and Election Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.026*** 0.065***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021)
Days_late_pos i,t  x  Endbalance i,t ‐0.027*** ‐0.021** ‐0.018***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Days_late_pos i,t   x Gov_spl i,t ‐0.111*** ‐0.071** ‐0.074***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
Days_late_pos i,t   x Elex i,t 0.081*** 0.068***
(0.018) (0.022)
Estimator GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 2.965 3.065 2.994 2.939 2.995
Number of states 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266 266 266
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for more details.
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐year GO debt
Table 3. Robustness: Using Legislative Delays as indicator for Late Budgets 
(1) (2) (3)
Days_delayed_neg i,t ‐0.006 0.012 0.014
(0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
Days_delayed_pos i,t 0.027*** 0.013 0.028***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Estimator OLS FE GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 4.899 2.709 2.918
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 262 262 262
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
GMMSYS estimates are obtained using the dependent variable lagged twice or more as 
instruments in the differenced equation. The level equation uses the lagged first difference of 
the dependent variable as instrument.
Robust standard errors in parentheses in colums (2)‐(6). Cluster adjusted standard errors used 
in colum (1)
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for 
more details.
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐
year GO debt
Table A1.  The Effect Fiscal Rules on Yield Spreads
(1) (2) (3)
Days_late_neg i,t 0.004 0.005 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.019*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Rev_shock i,t ‐0.155 ‐0.062 ‐0.045
(0.125) (0.078) (0.064)
Rev_shock i,t   x No_carry i 0.22
(0.148)
Rev_shock i,t   x Spending_limit i,t 0.167
(0.134)
Rev_shock i,t   x Revenue_limit i,t ‐0.043
(0.160)
Exp_shock i,t 0.339*** 0.251*** 0.011
(0.122) (0.089) (0.078)
Exp_shock i,t   x No_carry i ‐0.411**
(0.183)
Exp_shock i,t   x Spending_limit i,t ‐0.306
(0.198)
Exp_shock i,t   x Revenue_limit i,t 0.332***
(0.127)
Estimator GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 2.805 2.895 2.929
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on   20‐year 
GO debt
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for 
more details.
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Chubb i,t Average of summer and winter observation of the "Chubb Relative 
Value Survey", given as the surveyed yield spread on 20‐year general
obligation bond relative to New Jersey
Lowry and Alt (2001) and 
Poterba and Reuben (2001)
Days_late i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to budget signed into law Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed i,t Number of days from legislative deadline to legislative budget 
passage
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Late_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was signed into law after end 
of fiscal year
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Delayed_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature after 
legislative deadline
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_late_pos i,t Equal to days_late i,t   x late_budget i,t Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_late_neg i,t Equal to days_late i,t   x (1‐late_budget i,t ) Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed_pos i,t Equal to days_delayed i,t   x delayed_budget i,t Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed_neg i,t Equal to days_delayed i,t   x (1‐delayed_budget i,t ) Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Unempl_change i,t Change in unemployment rate since previous year Bureau of Labor Statistics
Gov_spl i,t General Government surplus relative to GDP US Census Bureau
Gov_surplus i,t gov_spl  if gov_spl >0, and zero otherwise US Census Bureau
Gov_deficit i,t ‐gov_spl  if gov_spl <0 and zero otherwise US Census Bureau
Debt i,t Debt at the end of fiscal year scaled relative to GDP US Census Bureau
Moodys i,t Moodys credit rating on 20‐year GO bonds, ranging from 4 to 1, 
where Aaa=4, Aa=3, A=2, Baa=1
Alt and Lowry (2001)
D_Moodys i,t Moodys i,t ‐Moodys i,t‐1 Alt and Lowry (2001)
Divided_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if either i)  both legislative chambers 
controlled by other party than governor's, or ii)  two chambers 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jou
rnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Elex i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 in years with a gubernatorial election Book of the States, various 
editions.
Population i,t State population (in millions of people) U.S. Census Bureau
GDP i,t State GDP Bureau of Economic Analysis
Endbalance i,t End‐of‐year balances in the general fund and stabilization fund, as 
projected in executive budget proposal. Measured in percent of 
proposed general fund expenditure
National Association of State 
Budget Officers: The Fiscal 
Survey of States , various editions
Ideology_gov i,t Score of government (governor and two major party delegations in 
house and senate) ideology. Ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 being the 
most conservative value and 100 the most liberal position.
Berry et al (1998)
Supermajority i Dummy variable equal to 1 if a supermajority vote is required to 
pass each budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
No_carry i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law does not allow a budget 
deficit to be carried over to the next fiscal year 
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Revenue_limit i,t Dummy equal to one if a revenue limit is in place Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Spending_limit i,t Dummy equal to one if a spending limit is in place
Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Exp_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund expenditure from 
original projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund revenue from original 
projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Table A3. Late budgets data by state
Information on late budget 
available for (1)
Responded to survey Number of late 
budgets observed
Alabama 1989, 1991‐1997 No 0
California 1988‐1997 Yes 9
Connecticut 1988‐1997 Yes 1
Delaware 1992‐1997 No 5
Florida 1988‐1997 Yes 1
Georgia 1988‐92, 1993 , 1994‐1997 Yes 0
Illinois 1988‐1997 Yes 7
Kentucky 1988‐1997 No 0
Louisiana 1988‐1997 No 7
Maine 1991‐1997 Yes 1
Maryland 1991‐1997 No 0
Massachusetts 1988‐1997 Yes 8
Michigan 1988‐89, 1991, 1995‐1997 No 2
Minnesota 1988‐1997 No 0
Mississippi 1997 Yes 0
Missouri 1988‐1997 No 0
Nevada 1991‐1997 No 1
New Hampshire 1991‐1997 No 2
New Mexico 1988‐94 , 1995‐1997 Yes 0
New York 1988‐1997 No 10
North Carolina 1988‐1997 No 10
North Dakota 1988‐1997 Yes 0
Ohio 1988‐1997 No 3
Oklahoma 1993‐1997 No 0
Oregon 1988‐90, 1992‐1997 No 3
Pennsylvania 1988‐1997 Yes 4
Rhode Island 1988‐1997 Yes 0
South Carolina 1988‐1997 Yes 0
Tennessee 1995‐1997 No 0
Texas 1988‐1997 No 0
Utah 1989‐1997 No 0
Vermont 1988‐1997 No 0
Virginia 1988‐1997 Yes 0
Washington 1988‐1997 Yes 0
West Virginia 1988‐92 , 1993‐1997 Yes 0
Wisconsin 1988‐1997 Yes 5
Notes: 
(1) Normal font indicates that authors' own data collection is the only source of information. Italics indicate that the survey sent to state budget 
offices is the only source of information. Bold indicates that information is available from both sources. 
